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INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 2006, forty-year-old Ginnah Muhammad brought suit
against Enterprise Rent-A-Car seeking relief for $2,750 in assessed damages to
a rental car, damages she claimed were caused by thieves. Rather than
discussing her claims, however, the court focused on her sartorial choices:
Muhammad arrived in court wearing the niqab-a modesty veil, worn by some
devout Muslim women, covering the head and face with the exception of the
eyes.' Presiding Judge Paul Paruk gave her the choice of removing the niqab,
or having her case dismissed. Paruk's reasoning appeared to be pragmatic: "I
can't see your face and I can't tell whether you're telling me the truth and I
can't see certain things about your demeanor and temperament that I need to
see in a court of law." 2 Muhammad parried, requesting that her case be heard in
front of a female judge before whom she would feel comfortable removing her
veil. When Paruk rejected this option as impossible, Muhammad chose to have
her case dismissed rather than remove her veil, stating, "I wish to respect my
religion and so I will not take off my clothes."
3
Neither Muhammad nor any commentator contends that Paruk's actions
stemmed from anti-Muslim animus. To the contrary, his courtroom rules-
while not statutorily mandated-appeared motivated by the desire to accurately
judge the veracity of witnesses' statements. Moreover, his decision would
appear to be in line with the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence:
when faced with a conflict between religious practice and a rule or statute
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2009; University of Cambridge, M.Phil 2006; Ecole des Hautes
Etudes en Sciences Sociales, D.E.A. 2005; Harvard University, A.B. 2004. The author is indebted to
Professor Jack Balkin, Dr. Leo X. McCusker, Amanda Shanor, and Bronwen McShea for their critiques
of this Comment's argument during its development, and owes special thanks to Susan McCusker, Mary
Rosaleen Lawler, Elbridge Colby, Brian Jenn, Marin Levy, and Wally Adeyemo for insightful editing
and comments on earlier drafts.
1. Catherine Elsworth, Defeat for Woman Who Refused To Take Off Her Veil, TELEGRAPH
(London), Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/
10/24/wveil24.xml.
2. Transcript of Record at 4, Muhammad v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car, No. 06-41896-GC (Mich. 31st
Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 2006).
3. Id. at 6.
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facially neutral toward religion, the Court's rulings indicate that religious
practice must cede to facially neutral rules.4 As applied here, however, that
jurisprudence forced Ginnah Muhammad to choose between following the
tenets of her religion and pursuing justice through the courts. Ultimately,
Muhammad chose to opt out of a key aspect of public life rather than abandon
what she saw as her religious duty.
This Comment argues that Muhammad's case points to a line of
jurisprudential difficulty that will become increasingly prevalent in the coming
years. The principle that religious practice must bend to laws of general
applicability in cases of conflict has reigned more or less dominant over the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence throughout American history.' And
most conflicts up to this point have involved minority religions-the Church of
Jesus Christ of Later Day Saints6 and Native American religions,7 for
example-whose practices, like polygamy and the use of peyote in religious
ceremonies, faced widespread public disapproval and were often directly
outlawed by secular law.8 This Comment argues that an increasing number of
cases will emerge in coming decades in which the religious practices of major
religions will come into more "accidental" contact with ancillary aspects of law
and that these conflicts risk causing religious organizations and people to opt
out of public life, thereby threatening democratic participation.
To that end, Part I outlines the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with regard
to laws of general applicability that prohibit or conflict with religious practices.
Part II argues that the effects of that jurisprudence have become more
pronounced as a result of increased pluralism resulting from immigration and
the growing divergence between secular law and traditional religious practices.
Together, these two trends will cause more conflicts to arise between laws of
general applicability and religious practices unforeseen or unconsidered by the
drafters of those laws. These conflicts will likely result in increasing numbers
of sincerely religious people and organizations choosing to "opt out" of aspects
of public life rather than abandon their religious principles. Finally, Part III
suggests possible legislative measures for ensuring that people of religious faith
remain active participants in society, thereby maintaining the current balance of
relations between religious practices and secular law without abandoning the
regnant Smith line of jurisprudence. These include maintaining the current and
previous balance of relations between religious practices and secular law
through increased legislative carve-outs for religious people and groups, the
4. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
5. See 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 110-13
(3d ed. 1999).
6. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
7. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
8. See, e.g., U.S. REV. STAT. § 5352 (1878) (outlawing polygamy); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)
(1987) (prohibiting the possession of nonprescribed "controlled substances," including peyote).
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statutory return to a compelling state interest model via state legislation,
potential "minimization procedures," and requiring religious impact statements
for proposed legislation.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RELIGION AND LAWS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
From the Supreme Court's first major free exercise cases in the late
nineteenth century through the early part of the twentieth century, the Court's
jurisprudence with regard to conflicts between laws of general applicability and
religious practices was weighted toward secular laws and away from religious
minorities.9 The landmark case of this period is Reynolds v. United States, in
which the Court famously upheld a federal law prohibiting polygamy against a
Mormon who claimed that polygamy was his religious duty. The Court's
reasoning was simple: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may
with practices. ' 1° During this period, it appeared clear that religious practices
must give way to generally applicable secular statutes. Religious minorities did
win exemptions from some facially neutral laws, but this occurred most often
when a free speech or due process claim applicable to all individuals,
regardless of religion, was also involved.1
Between 1963 and 1989, the Court's jurisprudence took a different turn
which seemed-at least in theory-to shift the balance toward upholding
religious practices that conflicted with laws of general applicability. During this
period, the Court applied a balancing test to determine whether religious
individuals and groups had the right to exemptions from generally applicable
laws. The individual claiming the exemption was required to demonstrate that
the generally applicable statute interfered with his ability to practice his
religion, while the state was required to demonstrate that granting an exception
would interfere with a compelling state interest.' 2 In balancing the two
interests, if the Court found the secular end sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the burden on the religious person's free exercise and found the statute
9. ROTUNDA & NOWALK, supra note 5, at 110 ("The Court's opinions prior to 1963 did not give
special protection to religiously motivated activity."); see also Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
293 U.S. 245 (1934).
10. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
11. See, e.g., W.V. State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that children
who were Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled to recite the pledge of allegiance in public
schools); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down the arrest and conviction of
Jehovah's Witnesses who distributed religious literature without a license that could only be obtained
from a licensing officer who determined whether the literature was religious); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down a requirement that children attend public schools as opposed to
parochial, religious, and other private schools). But see Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940) (denying Jehovah's Witnesses a Free Exercise Clause exemption from a flag salute statute),
overruled, Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
12. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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narrowly tailored to promote that end, the statute was allowed to stand. 13 In
theory, this line of jurisprudence should have allowed for more exemptions to
religious minorities than the previous standard, but in practice the story was far
different. 14 Although the Court granted Amish children an exemption from
mandatory school attendance laws in perhaps the most celebrated case of this
period, 15 in the final tally, however, relatively few exemptions were granted
under this test.
Since 1990, the Court has retreated from the two-part balancing test in
favor of a standard reminiscent of the one it employed in the early part of the
twentieth century. In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court upheld a statute
banning the use of the psychotropic peyote plant in Native American religious
rituals. 16 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that "if
prohibiting the exercise of religion .... is not the object of a [law], but merely
the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the
First Amendment has not been offended."' 17 The Court explicitly affirmed that
the state need satisfy the compelling interest test only in the case of laws
targeting a specific religion, not when authorizing a law of general
applicability. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,18 the Court
invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting certain forms of animal slaughter on
the grounds that the ordinance had been erected to ban the worship rite of a
particular sect. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that:
a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling government interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice . . . . A law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a comjelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 
9
Only three years after the Court's decision in Smith, Congress responded by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which
attempted to reinstate by statute the compelling standard test for free exercise.
20
RFRA provided that the "Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except ... in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and... [if the law] is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.' 21 Although the Court had explicitly allowed room for
13. ROTUNDA & NOWALK, supra note 5, at 110.
14. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 30
(2006).
15. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. Id. at 878.
18. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
19. Id. at 531.
20. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in
scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000).
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legislative exemptions to generally applicable laws, 22 its reaction to RFRA was
swift. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck down RFRA's application to
state laws on grounds that the statute exceeded Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment power by impermissibly expanding the First Amendment and
thereby intruding into the states' general authority to regulate for the health and
welfare of their citizens. 23 In Boerne's wake, Congress has passed RFRA-like
legislation to govern certain limited spheres, such as land use.24 Further, several
states have passed state-wide versions of RFRA,25 although passage of RFRA-
like statutes has failed in other states, including Ginnah Muhammad's home
state of Michigan.
26
II. THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LAWS OF GENERAL
APPLICABILITY
Adherents of minority religions brought many of the cases that arose under
the Free Exercise Clause during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, for example, had fewer than one
million followers until 1947,27 and there were significantly fewer in 1878 when
Reynolds was decided. Similarly, only 47,000 Americans self-identified as
adherents of Native American religions in the 1990 census.
28
That minority religions should more often find their practices prohibited by
laws of general applicability should not surprise; widely held religions are more
likely to be taken into account when legislation is drafted. Much legislation,
particularly in the early Republic, had roots that could be traced either directly
22. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.
23. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court recently upheld RFRA's application to federal statutes in
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
24. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (Supp. 2003). In passing RLUIPA, "Congress attempted to avoid the constitutional defects of
RFRA, both by narrowing the scope of the law to the land use and institutional (primarily prison)
contexts and by developing a legislative record that found a history of discrimination in land use
practice." Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions' Auxiliary Uses, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 207, 221 (2006)
(footnotes omitted).
25. See ALA. CONST. amend. 622; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1493.01 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-571b (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN § 761.03 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402
(2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/15 (West 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2007); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-22-3 (LexisNexis 2003); 51 OKLA. STAT. § 251 (2006); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2401 (2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §42-80.1-3 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (2003); TEX. CODE ANN. § 100.003
(Vernon 2004).
26. See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Question of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with
Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 597 n.2 (1999).
27. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Church Growth,
http://www.mormon.org/learn/0,8672,967-1,00.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
28. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 73 (2007) [hereinafter RELIGION
IDENTIFICATION REPORT], available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/population/religion/.
Note that because the Census Bureau is prohibited from asking a mandatory question on religious
affiliation, see 13 U.S.C. § 221(3)(c) (2000), these figures are self-reported on a voluntary basis and
hence are probably understated.
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to the dominant mainline Protestant churches or indirectly to their concomitant
worldview. 29 As the nation grew, its reform movements-which in several
cases went on to spawn legislation and even constitutional amendments-were
influenced by religion. The role of religion in abolitionism and the passing of
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the temperance
movement and the Eighteenth Amendment, female suffrage and the Nineteenth
Amendment, and the civil rights movement and the repeal of Jim Crow laws is
well documented by scholars. 30 Secular laws of general applicability could be
expected to conflict with mainstream religions infrequently because they were
constructed with those religions as part of their lawmakers' worldviews,
whether as their own religions or as religions shared by those around them.
Indeed, Ginnah Muhammad's case supports a further nuance of this idea
that minority religions should more often come into accidental conflict with
laws of general applicability. Muhammad's refusal to remove her veil was
couched in striking language: "I will not take off my clothes." 31 Most non-
Muslim women would agree that one should not be asked to remove one's
clothing to testify in court. The dissonance was definitional: those who drafted
the rules governing Paruk's courtroom would never have thought to consider a
face-covering "clothes" in the same sense that a skirt and blouse are "clothes,"
while to Muhammad this was a natural use of the word and the concept. From
this difference in background assumptions arose Muhammad's conflict.
The effect, then, of a jurisprudence that consistently allows laws of general
applicability to "trump" conflicting religious practices would be to screen out
not only those religious practices that are hostile to commonly held opinion and
directly outlawed by general applicability laws (as in the cases of peyote use
and polygamy), but also those practices that are merely foreign to commonly
held opinion and thus come into "accidental" contact with facially neutral laws
(as in Ginnah Muhammed's own case). In both instances, however, the
outlawed religious practices will predominantly be those of minority religions.
A. Changes in the Effects of Free Exercise Jurisprudence Due to Immigration
In a religiously homogeneous nation populated mainly by practicing
mainline Protestants, 32 this line of jurisprudence relatively infrequently
29. See, e.g., PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 192-98 (1965); see also Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127, 198 (1844) ("It is also said, and
truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the common law of Pennsylvania."); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59 ("Christianity is part of the laws of England.")
30. See, e.g., PATRICIA U. BONOMI, UNDER THE COPE OF HEAVEN: RELIGION, SOCIETY, AND
POLITICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA 221 (1986); DAVID L. CHAPPELL, A STONE OF HOPE: PROPHETIC
RELIGION AND THE DEATH OF JIM CROW (2004).
31. Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 4.
32. The first recorded census of religious bodies was reported in 1906 and included data from both
1890 and 1906. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RELIGIOUS BODIES: 1906
(Bulletin 103, 1910), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/03322287nolOI-110chO3.pdf
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produced instances of conflict between religious practices and facially neutral
laws.33 Those religions whose practices did conflict with secular laws of
general applicability tended to be minority religions whose practices were
widely regarded as illegitimate.
The demographics of the United States, however, have not remained steady
since the eighteenth century. Rather, the demographics of immigrants have
changed markedly in the past 150 years. According to the Census Bureau,
while 98.9% of immigrants to the United States in 1850 emigrated from Europe
or North America, by 1990 that number had dropped to 26.9%. In the same
period, immigration from Asia (including the portion of the Middle East
categorized as Southwest Asia) increased from 0.1% of all immigration to
26.3%, and immigration from Latin America increased from 0.9% to 44.3%.34
Similarly, while the absolute number of self-described Methodists,
Lutherans, and Episcopalians remained the same from 1990 to 2001 (that is,
adjusting for population growth, their proportion in the population declined
during that period), the number of Catholics increased apace with the increase
in population, and the number of Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus doubled or
tripled.3 5 The areas surrounding Detroit, from which Ginnah Muhammad hails,
are heavily Muslim, home to many immigrants. 36 This change is not mere
happenstance but rather, at least in part, the result of legislative action.
American immigration policy has changed significantly over the past forty
years,37 sparked by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which
reflected changing attitudes toward race.
38
This shift in demographics means that an increasing number of American
citizens belong to religions not shared by the American Founders or by the
members of the legislative branch who have written the majority of laws by
which we live.39 Inevitably, then, many citizens belong to religions that those
who drafted the laws by which they are governed did not foresee.
(describing the nation as 92.7% Protestant in 1890 and 92.2% Protestant in 1906).
33. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, at 6.
34. Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born
Population of the United States: 1850-1990 tbl.2 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, 1999),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twpsOO29.html.
35. RELIGION IDENTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 27.
36. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK tbl.B-2 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/smadb/smadb-06tableb.pdf (reporting that between
April 1, 2000 and July 1, 2005, Detroit had 72,285 international immigrants).
37. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS AND ISSUES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at
xxxvi (Michael Lemay & Elliott Robert Barkan eds., 1999).
38. Hart-Celler Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
39. Reuters, Catholics Top Faith in New U.S. Congress, Jan 3, 2007, available at
http://www.wwm.org/article.php?idd=23844&sec=57&cont=all.
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B. Changes in the Effects of Free Exercise Jurisprudence Due to Increasing
Secularity
The other religious demographic-along with Islam, Buddhism, and
Hinduism-that doubled between 1999 and 2001 is those adults who self-
identify as having "no religion," a number that also includes those who are
atheists, agnostics, humanists, or secular.40 Experts argue that, proportionally,
there are more atheists in the world than ever before.41 Further, Americans in
positions of influence who continue to adhere to organized religions
increasingly practice their religions in more "modem," or less traditional, ways.
That is, in the United States, the education levels of various denominations are
inversely correlated with their church attendance: Episcopalians are both the
most highly educated and attend church the least often among Christian
denominations, while Baptists are the least educated and attend church most
42regularly. In addition, religions with high attendance rates correlated
positively with belief in an afterlife, belief in miracles, and belief in the Bible
as the literal truth.4 3 Because education correlates well with public influence,4 4
those denominations whose adherents have public influence are more likely to
have adherents who spend less time in church and believe fewer traditional
teachings.
This shift in religiosity will have an impact not only on minority religions
but also on religions adhering to traditional ethical notions not shared by a less
religious populace or considered by legislators and courts. Such traditionally
religious individuals are more likely to find their religious practices in conflict
with facially neutral laws than they would have a century ago when traditional
religious moral notions were more widespread. One recent illustrative example
of this phenomenon is Catholic Charities' decision to end its 100-year old
adoption service when faced with a Massachusetts ordinance outlawing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which would have forced the
organization to place children with homosexual couples in violation of its
perceived religious mission.45 As in the case of Ginnah Muhammad, when
given the choice between abandoning its religious principles and opting out of
public life, Catholic Charities chose the latter.
40. RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 27.
41. Phil Zuckerman, Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO ATHEISM 47, 59 (2007).
42. Bruce Sacerdote & Edward L. Glaeser, Education and Religion 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8080, 2001), available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/
hier/2001 papers/HIER1 913.pdf.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Every Senator in the 110th Congress, for example, has at least a bachelor's degree. See
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/
biosearch.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (search by position and Congress number).
45. Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006,
at A14.
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It seems likely that the combination of these two factors-the increase in
pluralism as a result of immigration and a decrease in religiosity-will lead to
increasing numbers of situations in which the religious beliefs of traditionally
religious people and groups will come into conflict with facially neutral laws of
general application.
III. SOLUTIONS: PRESERVING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION STATUTORILY
If changes in demographics and society's regnant ethos lead to an increase
in the number of conflicts between religious practices and laws of general
applicability, the effect of a jurisprudence granting almost complete deference
to the latter will be to create situations that ask religious people to choose
between being faithful to their religious beliefs and opting out of public life.
Often, the sincerely religious can be expected to make that choice in favor of
religion. And in many cases-like those exemplified by Ginnah Muhammad
and Catholic Charities-the result of that choice will be that individuals or
groups will not only cease offering the services they once provided to society,
but may also choose to opt out of participation in the democratic process.
A. Legislative Carve-Outs
How could legislators avoid this result, if they wished to? The most obvious
way would be to continue creating ad hoc carve-outs from statutes for those
whose religious practices are hindered by them. This has been done, for
example, for the use of peyote in Native American religious ceremonies.46 Such
carve-outs could apply to both statutes and procedural rules. In Ginnah
Muhammad's case, such a carve-out might allow for testimony by veiled
women on the premise that there are ways of determining the veracity of
people's statements without seeing their face (from voice intonation or word
choice, for example),47 or even for the granting of Muhammad's request for the
use of female judges in the limited context of small claims courts. 48
Solving conflicts between free exercise and laws of general applicability
through a carve-out system has the virtue of allowing legislators to consider
each religious practice and its effects in turn, to see how dangerous or hostile to
civil order it actually is and how often the prohibiting of the practice would
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000).
47. Many small claims courts allow testimony over the phone from witnesses who are ill, disabled,
out of state, or unable to take time off of work. See RALPH WARNER, EVERYBODY'S GUIDE TO SMALL
CLAIMS COURT 211 (2006).
48. Small claims courts differ from other courts in that the plaintiff is often his own only witness.
See id. at 198 (recommending the use of witnesses in some cases, and adding that in others, "witnesses
aren't as necessary"). Further, in most states, jury trials are not available in small claims court. Id. at
152. Thus, small claims proceedings have two unique characteristics: one veiled witness is particularly
likely to be central to one side's case, and there would no need to worry about the constitutional
concerns that could arise from a request for an all-female jury.
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cause the exclusion of religious groups and people from public life. This virtue,
though, is also the practice's weakness: it provides for the sort of discretionary
judgment by public officials on the merits of religious practices that the Court
held unconstitutional in Cantwell v. Connecticut.49 Further, carve-outs can
themselves negatively impact the widespread participation in public life that is
democracy's lifeblood by undermining the notion of equal application of the
law and, ironically, by allowing the very opting-out of public life that they were
implemented to eliminate.
B. Statewide RFRAs
Several alternatives to more piecemeal, discretionary approaches are
available. First, legislatures could consider the enactment of RFRAs at a
statewide level. Boerne struck down, as an infringement of the states' police
power, Congress's attempt (via the federal RFRA) to reintroduce the
compelling state interest standard for state legislation that interfered with
religious practices. However, as mentioned above, twelve states have passed
RFRAs of their own, requiring their legislatures to establish a compelling
interest before interfering with a religious practice. 51 Indeed, Alabama has gone
so far as to enshrine RFRA-like language into its state constitution, thereby
ensuring that not only legislatures, but all branches of government are held to
the compelling interest standard.52 In Ginnah Muhammad's case, this
distinction is particularly relevant as it was a judicial rule, rather than a statute,
which brought about her predicament.
C. Minimization Procedures
Second, legislatures could require that a form of "minimization procedure"
be enacted in all cases in which laws of general applicability and religious
practices come into conflict. Such a strategy would ask lawmakers and
religious groups to identify which parts of a religion's practices were essential
and which were merely customary or incidental. In Muhammad, both Ginnah
Muhammad and the presiding judge seemed to be pushing for such an
accommodation, with Muhammad suggesting that the need to see a witness's
face or to be tried by a male judge were not essential to the trial process and
Judge Paruk suggesting that the niqab is a custom rather than "a religious
thing. 53 The difficulty with such a remedy, as evidenced in this case, is that the
two parties may differ as to which aspects of their own sphere are essential,
49. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940).
50. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
51. See supra note 25.
52. ALA. CONST. amend. 622.
53. Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 5.
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with each arguing for the importance of the element of his own practice.
Self-identification of nonessential practices, therefore, could be
inefficacious, while allowing such distinctions to be made by a third party
would again smack of the discretionary factor that the Supreme Court deemed
illegitimate in Cantwell.4 One further possibility in this line of thinking would
be to allow religious groups and government bodies as a whole (rather than on
the individual level) to designate certain practices as essential or nonessential,
thereby making the decision on behalf of their parishioners or practitioners.
This practice, though, might fall prey to the charge that it did not sufficiently
protect individual conscience, particularly in cases in which widespread
disagreement existed within a religious body as to which religious practices
were really essential.
D. Religious Impact Statements
Finally, states could require religious impact statements, analogous to the
environmental impact statements required under the National Environmental
Protection Act of 1969,55 to be appended to potential legislation. Such a
solution has great advantages. It does not fall afoul of the Establishment
Clause, because impact statements would not require action, but rather alert
legislators to potential difficulties. Further, it could greatly mitigate the number
of "accidental conflicts" between religious practice and secular statutes that can
arise when certain religions simply fall outside of legislators' fields of view.
Finally, a model exists to aid in implementation in the analogous institution of
environmental impact statements.
However, the differences between the environment and religion could give
rise to difficulties with religious impact statements. Environmental impact
statements must be produced in connection with all "major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 56 Religious
impact statements, however, would be intended to discover which statutes
affected "the quality of human religion" rather than merely applying to that
already established sphere. As such, they could require wider use and, thus,
greater administrative burden.
Moreover, one question that often arises in the examination of
environmental impact statements is how to define "environment," a term that
courts have chosen to interpret broadly. 57 A similar issue would doubtless arise
in the case of religion-which beliefs systems and groups count as religions,
and which are mere world views or social organizations? While just as complex
54. 310 U.S. at 307.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
56. Id. § 4332(c).
57. MARTIN S. BAKER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A GUIDE TO PREPARATION
AND REVIEW 4 (1977).
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as the question of defining "environment," giving meaning to the term
"religious" in this context would be a particularly sensitive area of inquiry.
Indeed, one major strain in Free Exercise jurisprudence that has been
completely consistent over the years is that the government may not define
what constitutes religion.58 An opt-in process whereby religions registered to be
considered in religious impact statements, however, could somewhat alleviate
this problem.
CONCLUSION
As this Comment goes to press, Ginnah Muhammad has reportedly been
granted a new hearing, following her appeal of Paruk's earlier ruling.59 It is not
yet clear whether Muhammad will be allowed to wear her niqab during that
proceeding.
Regardless of the outcome of her trial, however, Muhammad's case points
not merely to an idiosyncratic clash between the religious practices of
conservative Muslims and the rules of American trial practice, but rather to a
growing trend of cases whose resolution could have serious consequences for
the democratic participation of religious individuals and organizations. Current
Supreme Court jurisprudence is ill equipped to deal with a rise in the number of
conflicts between religious practice and statutes of general applicability.
Without legislative aid, the application of Smith-type reasoning may
increasingly lead to the self-exclusion of religious minorities from the public
sphere. The solutions to this problem that this Comment has suggested are
certainly not exhaustive, but are rather a call for legislators to begin considering
how they will face this new challenge.
58. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307.
59. Zachary Gorchow, Woman Who Refused To Remove Veil Granted a New Hearing, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Jan. 23, 2007.
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